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ABSTRACT 
 
Globalization – viewed as a process of economic integration that embraces governance as 
well as markets – could lead to worldwide convergence toward higher or lower 
environmental quality, or to environmental polarization in which the ‘greening’ of the 
global North is accompanied by the ‘browning’ of the global South. The outcome will not 
be dictated by an inexorable logic. Rather it will depend on how the opportunities created 
by globalization alter balances of power within countries and among them.  
 
 
Keywords: globalization; North-South trade; environment; governance 
 
JEL classifications: F02, F18, O13, Q52, Q56, Q58 
                                                 
* Forthcoming in The Oxford Review of Economic Policy (http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/). 
 3
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the early 1990s, the environmental movement in the United States underwent an 
acrimonious split over whether to support the proposed North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Some groups backed the treaty, agreeing that ‘the best way to 
ensure that Mexico’s environment is cleaned up is to help Mexico become a prosperous 
country, and that means NAFTA.’i Others opposed it, arguing that ‘the competition to 
attract investment will result in a lowest common denominator for environmental 
statutes’ and that ‘the country with the least restrictive statutes will become the floor, and 
others will harmonize downward to that floor.’ii
 
Despite their differences, both sides shared a common assumption: Mexico’s 
environmental practices were inferior to those of the U.S. and Canada. The only point of 
contention was whether free trade would pull the U.S. and Canada down to Mexico’s 
level, or lift Mexico to the plane of its northern neighbors. Partly as a result, both sides 
were oblivious to what may turn out to be NAFTA’s most serious environmental impact: 
the erosion of Mexico’s rich biological diversity in maize (‘corn’ in U.S. parlance), as 
Mexican campesino farmers abandon traditional agriculture in the face of competition 
from cheap corn imported from the U.S.iii  
 
In this paper, I question the assumption the global North is relatively ‘green’ and the 
global South relatively ‘brown.’ I also argue neither theoretical reasoning nor empirical 
evidence supports the axiomatic claims that ‘globalization’ will promote a convergence 
toward better environmental practices, or toward worse environmental practices, or 
instead an growing divergence in environmental practices across countries. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section characterizes globalization as a 
process that has been uneven not only across space but also across institutional spheres. 
Section 3 distinguishes among four different scenarios of environmental convergence. 
Section 4 turns to the possibility of environmental polarization, whereby improvements in 
some places are accompanied by deterioration in others. Section 5 discusses the special 
subset of environmental problems known as ‘global environmental change,’ that is, 
environmental impacts that operate on a global scale. Section 6 briefly addresses a 
neglected environmental issue – war – in relation to globalization. Section 7 considers the 
prospects for global environmental governance, and Section 8 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
II. UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION 
 
‘Globalization’, here defined as the integration of economic activities around the world, 
has long been an uneven process, not only across regions but also across the social 
spheres that structure economic activity. In general, globalization has proceeded furthest 
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in the sphere of the market – more precisely, in capital and product markets, since labor 
mobility remains far more constrained by national borders. In the sphere of governance, 
globalization generally has not proceeded as far.iv Geographical disparities in extent of 
globalization have been well documented (see, for example, Sutcliffe 2004). My focus 
here is institutional disparities between globalization of the market and globalization of 
governance, particularly as these affect environmental quality. 
 
Both markets and governance are integral parts of economies. Markets are nested within 
social institutions that both enable them to function and temper their effects. The rise of 
capitalism was characterized by what Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944], p. 132) called a ‘double 
movement’: the expansion of the market, coupled with the expansion of ‘social protection 
aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization.’ The 
latter includes what today we call ‘environmental protection’ – measures that aim to 
redress environmental market failures associated with public goods and externalities. 
 
Globalization likewise entails the integration not only of markets, but also of governance, 
institutions ‘capable of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally, 
alleviating collective-action problems in a world of interdependent actors’ (Young, 1994, 
p. 15). The globalization of governance includes formal international agreements such as 
the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which curtailed the use of chemicals that deplete the Earth’s 
protective ozone layer; supranational institutions such as the European Union, which has 
recently proposed regulations that will shift onto manufacturers the burden of proof for 
safety of industrial chemicals released into the environment;v and informal governance by  
‘global civil society’ (Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996; Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002) and by 
decentralized ‘networks’ encompassing both state and non-state actors (Haas, 2003). 
 
When trade occurs at prices that do not capture external costs and external benefits, 
market integration is accompanied by the globalization of market failure (Boyce, 2002). 
Yet the absence of corrective policies also represents a governance failure. Institutions of 
governance can fail to redress market failures for reasons of both inability (for example, 
bureaucratic incompetence) and unwillingness (for example, the political influence of 
those who would bear the costs of internalization).vi The unevenness in the globalization 
of markets and governance exacerbates the ability side of the problem. As discussed 
below, it may also create new impediments on the willingness side. 
 
 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONVERGENCE: FOUR SCENARIOS 
 
In debates on North-South trade, it is often assumed that production processes in the 
global South tend to be more environmentally degrading than those in the global North, 
by virtue of weaker demand for environmental quality (ascribed to low incomes), the 
weaker ability of governments to promulgate and enforce environmental regulations, or 
both. Hence trade occurs on a tilted playing field, where Southern producers have a 
competitive advantage over their Northern counterparts thanks to their greater scope for 
externalization of costs. 
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Economic theory is often invoked to maintain that a level playing field – one with no 
international differences in environmental standards – is not necessarily optimal: the 
marginal costs and benefits of environmental quality are likely to vary across locations.vii 
Two points should be noted in this connection. First, this does not imply that existing 
variations in standards across countries are optimal, nor that moves toward greater 
harmonization would not be welfare-improving in conventional terms. Second, 
international differences in the ‘optimal’ level of environmental quality are partly – 
perhaps mainly – attributable to differences in ability to pay: in this sense it is ‘efficient’ 
for poorer people to breathe dirtier air. This distribution-blind notion of optimality is 
unexceptional in neoclassical economics, but its wider normative appeal as a basis for 
policy is questionable. Elsewhere I have suggested that a rights-based allocation of access 
to a clean and safe environment – a principle enshrined in dozens of national 
constitutions around the world – is an attractive alternative to the wealth-based allocation 
principle founded on willingness to pay.viii
 
Here, however, our concern is not normative prescription but rather positive description. 
As in the NAFTA debate, the question is whether economic integration will lead to 
‘harmonization upward’ in which the South becomes more like the North, or a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in which the opposite occurs. These opposing outcomes are labeled 
‘ecological modernization’ and ‘environmental protectionism,’ respectively, in Figure 1, 
based on prominent schools of thought that have emphasized these possibilities. 
 
[insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
In principle we can distinguish two further paths of convergence, in which the North-
South environmental gradient is reversed: that is, Southern production is cleaner and 
more sustainable than that of competing sectors in the North. That this is not a purely 
hypothetical possibility will be illustrated below. In Figure 1, these paths are labeled the 
‘greening the North’ (when the North moves up the gradient, becoming more like the  
South) and ‘environmental imperialism’ (when the South moves down the gradient to 
become more like the North).  
 
Of course, these stylized scenarios simplify complex processes. One scenario need not fit 
all environmental problems; it is quite possible, for example, that in some respects the 
environmental gradient runs from North to South while in others it runs in the opposite 
direction. Harmonization may occur not at either end of the spectrum, but rather 
somewhere in the middle. And in some cases globalization may promote divergence 
rather than convergence. To begin mapping out the possibilities, this section considers the 
four convergence scenarios in turn. 
 
(i) Ecological Modernization 
 
The term ‘ecological modernization’ was coined in the 1980s by European sociologists to 
describe recent changes in production and consumption in industrialized countries. In 
many cases these have reduced use of natural resources and emissions of pollutants per 
unit output, and in some cases these reductions have been substantial enough to generate 
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net environmental improvements alongside economic growth (see, for example, Weale, 
1992 and Spaargaren and Mol, 1992). 
 
Ecological modernization theorists interpret these transformations as a response not only 
to market signals, but more importantly to the growth of environmental concerns among 
the public and policy makers.ix Although originally put forward as an analysis of trends in 
industrialized countries, the theory has been extended globally by some of its proponents. 
In so doing, most have accepted the conventional premise that the environmental-quality 
gradient runs from North to South. Thus Mol (2001, 157) writes of ‘the need to 
harmonize environmental capacities and regimes up to at least the level that has been 
achieved in the [Europe-North America-Japan] triad countries.’  
 
Mechanisms identified as vehicles for such harmonization upward include income 
growth, foreign direct investment, international agreements, and ‘governance from 
below’: 
 
• A positive effect from income growth is premised on view that globalization leads 
to rising per capita incomes, and that the latter in turn lead to greater effective 
demand for environmental quality (often referred to as a better ability to ‘afford’ a 
cleaner environment). During the NAFTA debate, for example, Mexican president 
Carlos Salinas proclaimed, ‘Only through widespread prosperity can we have the 
resources to channel toward the protection of land, air and water’ (quoted by 
Hogenboom, 1998, 180). Both links – from globalization to rising incomes, and 
from rising incomes a better environment – are open to question. With respect to 
the latter link, it is important to recognize that many aspects of environmental 
quality are public goods. To be politically effective, demand for environmental 
quality therefore must be articulated through institutions that overcome both the 
free-rider problem and political opposition from the beneficiaries of cost 
externalization. I return to this issue in the next section. 
 
• Foreign direct investment is sometimes portrayed as a vehicle for environmental 
improvement on the grounds that foreign firms have superior technological know-
how, derived from production in countries with stricter regulations, and that they 
find it efficient to use standardized processes to produce standardized products. In 
addition, foreign firms may be more sensitive to reputational concerns than local 
firms, and more subject to media scrutiny and pressure from public opinion. In 
keeping with this prediction, some empirical studies have found evidence of 
‘pollution halos’ – above-average environmental performance – associated with 
foreign investment. In a review of this literature, Zarsky (1999, 14) concludes that 
the evidence is mixed, and that ‘the most significant determinant of firm 
performance is community pressure’ rather than the origin of investment per se.x 
 
• International agreements can also promote upward harmonization in 
environmental practices. Examples of such agreements include the treaties on 
oceanic pollution, transport of hazardous waste, and ozone-depleting chemicals 
(see Table 1). Neumayer (2002) finds that the degree of democracy – as measured 
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by indices of political rights and ‘voice and accountability’ – is a strong predictor 
of whether countries will enter into environmental agreements, again pointing to 
the importance of political variables in determining outcomes. 
 
[insert Table 1 around here] 
 
• ‘Governance from below’ refers to de facto rules that are imposed not by 
governments, but by ‘civil society’ and public opinion. A series of studies at the 
World Bank, for example, has found that ‘informal regulation’ by local 
communities can limit industrial pollution even in the absence of formal 
regulation (see Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; Pargal et al., 1997). These studies 
generally find average income and education of communities to be strongly 
correlated with successful informal regulation. Transnational environmental 
alliances also can increase the bargaining power of local communities (see, for 
example, Keenan, de Echave, and Traynor, 2003). In addition to directly 
influencing the decisions of private firms and government officials, informal 
actors have developed third-party certification and ‘eco-labeling’ initiatives that 
respond to and influence consumer demands.xi 
 
(ii) Environmental Protectionism 
 
Instead of harmonization upward, many environmentalists maintain that globalization  
promotes a ‘race to the bottom,’ in which competition for private investment undermines 
environmental regulation. In its weaker variant, this argument holds that global 
competition impedes new regulation so that South countries remain ‘stuck at the bottom’ 
(Porter, 1999) and Northern countries are ‘stuck in the mud’ (Zarsky, 1997). In its 
stronger variant, globalization spurs the competitive lowering of standards in the North, 
ultimately leading to convergence on the lowest common denominator. Hence the claim 
in the NAFTA debate that the trade agreement would ‘sabotage’ U.S. environmental 
laws.xii  
 
The usual policy recommendation flowing from this analysis is that Northern countries 
should use compensating tariffs or other trade restrictions to prevent ‘ecological 
dumping’ – the sale of products at prices below their marginal social cost of production 
by virtue of externalization of environmental costs.xiii Hence this school of thought is here 
termed ‘environmental protectionism.’ 
 
The logic rests on the uneven globalization of markets and governance: 
 
International trade increases competition, and competition reduces costs. But 
competition can reduce costs in two ways: by increasing efficiency or by lowering 
standards. A firm can save money by lowering its standards for pollution control, 
worker safety, wages, health care and so on – all choices that externalize some of 
its costs… Nations maintain large legal, administrative and auditing structures 
that bar reductions in the social and environmental standards of domestic 
industries. There are no analogous international bodies of law and 
administration; there are only national laws, which differ widely. Consequently, 
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free international trade encourages industries to shift their production activities 
to the countries that have the lowest standards of cost internalization – hardly a 
move toward global efficiency. (Daly, 1993, 52). 
 
Empirical studies generally have concluded that environmental regulation does not, in 
fact, have much effect on firms’ competitiveness (for a review, see Jaffe et al., 1995). At 
the same time, however, studies of ‘revealed comparative advantage’ in pollution-
intensive industries (such as pulp and paper, mining, chemicals, and petroleum products) 
have found that countries in the global South and eastern Europe account for a rising 
share of world exports.xiv This relocation of ‘dirty industries’ – a policy infamously 
recommended by the World Bank’s chief economist in the early 1990s  (The Economist, 
1992) – occurs mainly via net additions to the capital stock, given sunk costs in existing 
Northern facilities.  
 
Even if there were robust evidence that dirty industries are migrating from North to 
South, this would not automatically put downward pressure on environmental standards 
in the North, as envisaged in the strong variant of the race-to-the-bottom logic. It is 
conceivable that instead Northern countries would allow, or even encourage, the 
displacement of environmental costs to the South, with international trade allowing them 
to import raw materials, intermediate inputs, and final products at prices held down by 
cost externalization. xv In other words, the North could maintain higher environmental 
standards domestically, while reaping ‘ecological subsidies’ from the South. I return to 
this possibility in section 4. 
 
(iii) Greening the North 
 
I now turn to scenarios where the environmental-quality gradient runs from South to 
North – that is, where Southern production is cleaner and more sustainable than 
competing production in the North. At first blush this may seem implausible, given the 
deeply ingrained assumption that environmental quality is a luxury that only the affluent 
can afford, or at least a normal good for which demand rises with income. Indeed it is 
often assumed that the ‘bottom billion’ – the world’s poorest people – ‘cause a 
disproportionate share of environmental degradation’ (Myers 1993, 23). 
 
This demand-driven model neglects the supply side of environmental quality. We know 
that the global North’s share of world income – and hence of world production and 
consumption – far exceeds that of the global South. In the year 2000, those countries with 
the richest 20% of the world’s population, in terms of per capita incomes, accounted for 
67 times as much income as the countries with the poorest 20%. The ratio narrows when 
computed on the basis of purchasing-power parity (PPP), but even then the average income 
of the richest quintile exceeded that of the poorest quintile by a ratio of sixteen to one 
(Sutcliffe, 2003, 10).   
 
Environmental degradation per unit income may vary across countries or income classes. 
If degradation were sufficiently concave in income, the poorest quintile in theory could 
generate more environmental degradation than the richest quintile. But merely to equal 
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the degradation generated by the top quintile, the environmental degradation per unit 
PPP-adjusted income in the bottom quintile would have to be sixteen times greater. Such 
a disparity seems improbable. In some respects, at least, environmental degradation per unit 
income may even be greater for the rich. Contrast, for example, the pollution generated by 
automobiles compared to bicycles, the amount of non-renewable resources used to produce 
a bushel of grain in the United States compared to India, or the pollution generated in the 
production and disposal of synthetic as opposed to natural fibres. 
 
If there is indeed a gradient along which certain aspects of environmental quality are better 
in the South than in the North, then an optimistic view of globalization is that it will promote 
the ‘greening of the North’ (Sachs et al., 1998). This is akin to the ecological modernization 
school of thought in that it emphasizes possibilities for harmonization upward, but with the 
difference that it reverses the relative positions of North and South. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two routes by which greening of the North could come about. 
The first is via reductions in Northern consumption levels, a change that could be brought 
about by either falling incomes or a shift in preferences away from goods in favor of leisure, 
as advocated by the ‘voluntary simplicity’ movement in the United States. There is little 
historical precedent, however, for expecting either to happen on a meaningful scale in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
The second is via transformations of production and consumption that reduce environmental 
degradation per unit income. This is sort of change envisioned by the ecological 
modernization school, but in this scenario it is the North that ‘catches up’ with the South in 
terms of environmental practices. 
 
Several recent trends in agriculture in the industrialized countries illustrate this possibility. 
In the United States, for example, organically grown products are now the fastest-growing 
segment of the food market, with sales rising at more than 20% annually in the past decade 
(Dimitri and Greene, 2002).  Urban agriculture and community-supported agriculture have 
also grown substantially, and even when these are not ‘organic’ (in the sense of zero use of 
agrochemicals), they minimize negative externalities in transportation, as well as generating 
positive externalities in the form of community amenities (Pinderhughes, 2003). On a 
related front, the ‘slow food’ movement that originated in Italy in the late 1980s is 
promoting the conservation and revival of traditional agricultural practices (Petrini, 2003).xvi 
Such ‘greening of the North’ is by no means a uniform process, however: it has come about 
partly as a reaction against other features of globalization, such as the use of genetically 
modified organisms in agriculture and the spread of multinational fast-food restaurant 
chains. 
 
(iv) Environmental Imperialism 
 
In the final convergence scenario, globalization undermines relatively clean, sustainable 
production in the global South. I term this ‘environmental imperialism’ to evoke the parallel 
with economic and political subordination of South to North. Here I illustrate this possibility 
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by means of two examples: the displacement of jute by polypropylene, and the displacement 
of Mexican maize by U.S. maize. 
 
Jute versus polypropylene 
 
Since the Second World War, international markets for renewable natural raw materials 
such as cotton, jute, sisal and rubber have faced increasingly tough competition from 
synthetic substitutes.xvii The former are produced mainly in the global South, the latter 
mainly in the global North. While the production of natural raw materials can have 
substantial negative environmental impacts (as in the case of pesticide-intensive cotton 
cultivation), in general synthetics entail greater environmental costs. The competition 
between jute and polypropylene is a case in point. 
 
Jute, traditionally used to produce hessian (burlap) cloth and carpet backing, is the second 
most important natural fibre in world trade after cotton. In the late 1960s, stimulated by U.S. 
military orders for sandbags for the Vietnam war, polypropylene began to compete with 
jute. Between 1970 and 1992, jute imports to North America and western Europe 
plummeted from 1.0 million to 52,000 metric tons, and jute’s real price fell by 70% (Boyce, 
1995). This collapse hit particularly hard at the incomes of small farmers and agricultural 
laborers in Bangladesh, the world’s premier jute exporting country. 
 
The environmental impacts of jute production are modest. Bangladeshi farmers use only 
modest amounts of chemical fertilizers and little pesticide on the crop. The country’s 
flooded jute fields support diverse fish populations, an important positive externality for 
rural people. Like all plants, jute sequesters atmospheric carbon, a further positive 
externality. At the end of the product life cycle, jute biodegrades in the soil.  
 
Polypropylene, jute’s main competitor, is manufactured by multinational petrochemical 
firms. The U.S. is the world’s leading producer. Polypropylene production generates 
emissions of numerous air pollutants, including particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, 
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and other toxins, in addition to carbon 
dioxide. Since it is not biodegradable, polypropylene generates further environmental costs 
in the form of landfill disposal, incineration, or litter at the end of the product life cycle.  
 
The price advantage that has helped polypropylene to displace jute arises in no small 
measure from the failure of market prices to internalize environmental costs.xviii The result 
of the global competition between the two has been the displacement of a relatively ‘green’ 
Southern product by a relatively ‘brown’ Northern product. Even within Bangladesh, plastic 
shopping bags have begun to replace jute ones.  
 
Maize: Mexico versus the United States 
 
Maize is the leading crop in both Mexico and the United States. Competition between 
producers in the two countries has intensified in recent years, as the Mexican government 
has cut support to small farmers and lowered maize tariffs. 
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Mexico is the historic center of origin of maize, and the modern center of the genetic 
diversity in the crop. In the hilly lands of southern and central Mexico, campesino farmers 
grow thousands of different varieties of maize in small plots that botanists call ‘evolutionary 
gardens’ (Wilkes, 1992). On these farms, the maize plant continues to evolve with the 
assistance of the human hand – in the process Darwin called ‘artificial selection’ – in 
response to climate change and newly emerging strains of pests and plant diseases. The 
campesinos thus provide a valuable positive externality to humankind – the in situ 
conservation and evolution of genetic diversity in one of our main food crops. 
 
In the United States, fewer than a dozen varieties account for half of total acreage under 
maize. Only a few hundred varieties, many of them closely related, are commercially 
available. The crop therefore suffers from genetic vulnerability – the eggs-in-one-basket 
syndrome – a problem dramatically revealed in 1970 when a new strain of leaf blight 
destroyed one-fifth of the nation’s corn harvest. In the effort to remain a step ahead of 
evolving pests and pathogens, U.S. plant breeders run a ‘varietal relay race,’ constantly 
developing new varieties that incorporate resistance to new threats. The average commercial 
lifespan of a U.S. corn variety is only seven years. The raw material for this race is the 
genetic diversity found in the evolutionary gardens of traditional agriculture. 
 
By the measuring stick of the market prices, U.S. farmers are more ‘efficient’ than their 
Mexican counterparts. Prior to NAFTA, U.S. maize sold at roughly $110/ton at the border, 
whereas Mexican growers received $240/ton. Several factors contribute to the price 
advantage of U.S. corn: (i) natural conditions such as better soils, more regular rainfall, and 
a killing frost that limits pest populations; (ii) farm subsidies that reduce U.S. market prices; 
(iii) the externalization of environmental costs, such as groundwater contamination by 
pesticides; and (iv) the failure of market prices to internalize the value of sustaining genetic 
diversity provided by Mexican farmers.xix
 
Since NAFTA went into effect, Mexican imports of U.S. corn have risen from less than one 
million tonnes/year to more than five million tonnes/year. Meanwhile the price of maize in 
Mexico has fallen by more than 70%.xx If these trends persist, they are likely to accelerate 
genetic erosion – the loss of intra-specific diversity – in the crop.xxi  
 
Some comfort can be taken from the fact that samples of many Mexican maize varieties are 
stored in ‘seed banks’ at agricultural research institutes in Mexico and elsewhere. But seed 
banks are insecure, being subject to the perennial hazards of underfunding, accidents, and 
war. Most of the maize stored in the world’s single largest collection, at the Vavilov Institute 
in St. Petersburg, today is believed to be non-viable due to inadequate maintenance. 
Moreover, having seeds ‘in the bank’ is not the same as knowing about varietal properties 
such as pest resistance and climate sensitivity, information that is most readily obtained in 
the field. And even at best, seed banks can conserve only the existing stock of genetic 
diversity; they cannot replicate the ongoing process of evolution that takes place in the 
farmers’ fields.xxii
 
As in the case of jute and polypropylene, the competition between Mexican and U.S. maize 
pits relatively ‘green’ production in the South against relatively ‘brown’ production in the 
 12
North. If we view globalization through a long-term lens, looking back to the era of 
colonialism and the industrial revolution, this may have been the more common type of 
race to the environmental bottom. 
 
 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL POLARIZATION 
 
Rather than convergence, globalization instead could promote polarization: widening 
disparities in environmental quality across countries. The most likely polarization 
scenario, discussed in this section, would combine environmental improvements in the 
global North together with increasing environmental degradation in the global South. 
Regardless of whether a ‘green’ North and ‘brown’ South is a good description of the 
current situation, it could be a prediction of where the world is headed.   
 
The impacts of pollution and natural resource depletion are often concentrated in specific 
localities. This fact opens possibilities for ‘environmental cost shifting’ so as to separate 
those who benefit from an economic activity from those who bear its external costs 
(Opschoor, 1992, 36). Globalization increases possibilities for environmental cost 
shifting by widening the spatial distance across which economic interactions take place. 
It  also can widen what can be termed the ‘social distance’ between the beneficiaries of 
cost externalization and those who bear these costs, making the latter less able to 
influence the actions of the former. The likelihood of polarization hinges on whether 
globalization also promotes countervailing forces, such as the development of global 
civil-society networks, which offset these effects by reducing social distance. 
 
To frame the discussion, I begin this section with a brief overview of the political 
economy of environmental degradation. In contrast to the neoclassical treatment of 
environmental problems as simply a result of missing markets and impersonal 
governance failures, political economy suggests that the identities of those who gain and 
lose by virtue of cost externalization help to determine the extent of corrective action 
undertaken by institutions of governance. I then review evidence on the impact of power 
disparities within countries on the magnitude of environmental degradation. I then turn to 
the impacts of globalization on prospects for environmental cost shifting. 
 
(i) Political Economy of Environmental Degradation 
 
Environmentally degrading economic activities generally involve winners who benefit 
from these activities as well as losers who bear their costs. Without winners, the activities 
would not occur. Without losers, their environmental impacts would not matter from the 
standpoint of human well-being. 
 
In analyzing the dynamics of environmental degradation, we therefore can ask why it is 
that the winners are able to impose environmental costs on the losers. When market 
failures take the form of environmental externalities, why do the institutions of 
governance fail to remedy them? There are three possible reasons: 
 
 13
• First, the losers may belong to future generations who are not here to defend 
themselves. In such cases, the only remedy for governance failure is a social 
commitment to an ethic of intergenerational responsibility. 
 
• Second, the losers may lack adequate information as to the extent or sources of 
environmental burdens. It is often difficult, for example, to link health problems 
to pollution, and to track pollution to its source. In such cases, environmental 
education and right-to-know legislation are crucial elements of a solution. 
 
• Third, the losers may lack sufficient power to alter the behavior of the winners. In 
such cases, a change in the balance of power between winners and losers is a 
necessary condition for greater environmental protection. 
 
Here I focus on the third explanation – power disparities – since this is most directly 
affected by globalization. 
 
In the past two decades, a growing body of literature has documented the uneven 
distribution of environmental burdens within countries, and their correlation with 
disparities in political power. In the United States, studies of ‘environmental justice’ have 
shown that communities with lower incomes and higher percentages of racial and ethnic 
minorities tend to face disproportionate environmental hazards.xxiii For example, even 
when controlling for income, Ash and Fetter (2002) find that African-Americans tend to 
reside not only in metropolitan areas with above-average levels of point-source air 
pollution, but also in localities that have higher-than-average pollution levels for the 
metropolitan area. 
 
In their analysis of informal regulation in Indonesia, Pargal and Wheeler (1996) similarly 
find that communities with lower average incomes and educational attainments tend to 
have higher levels of industrial water pollution, even after controlling for other variables 
such as the volume of output and the age of nearby factories. They attribute this to 
differences in the ‘implicit price’ of pollution, which they define as ‘the expected penalty 
or compensation exacted by the affected community.’ Following this logic, Hettige et al. 
(2000, 452) write that ‘cost-minimizing firms with flexible abatement choices will 
control pollution to the point where their marginal abatement costs equal the “price” 
exacted for pollution by the affected parties.’ The latter may include local communities, 
government officials, non-governmental organizations, stockholders, and consumers – all 
parties who are ‘in a position to impose some cost on a firm or plant if its emissions 
exceed the norms adopted by that group.’ The resulting ‘price’ of pollution varies across 
localities.  
 
Pollutees (those who bear costs from environmental degradation) can influence the 
decisions of polluters in two broad ways. The first is when their well-being enters directly 
into the polluters’ utility function. This can be termed internalization through sympathy. 
Following Sen (1975, 23), we can represent the degree of sympathy by means of a 
parameter, h, that indicates the weight placed on the well-being of others relative to one’s 
own well-being. When hi = 0, the polluter is indifferent to the well-being of the ith 
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individual. When hi = 1, the polluter values impacts on the ith individual the same as 
impacts on oneself.  If hi = 1 for all i individuals impacted by pollution, there is full 
internalization. 
 
The second way pollutees can influence the decisions of polluters is through the political 
process. This can be termed internalization through governance, with governance 
understood to encompass both formal or informal rules that constrain behavior. Like 
sympathy, the ability of pollutees to use governance to alter the behavior of polluters is a 
matter of degree. Let the parameter πi to represent the power of the ith individual to affect 
social decisions regarding pollution. Where πi = 0 for all pollutees, the ‘price’ of 
pollution (set implicitly by informal regulation or formal standards, or explicitly by 
pollution taxes or tradable permits) is likewise zero.  
 
More generally, we can describe environmental governance outcomes as following a 
power-weighted social decision rule (Boyce 2002, chs. 4-6):  
 
max ∑ πibi
                          i 
 
where bi = the net benefit that individual i derives from an environmentally degrading 
activity (net cost if  bi < 0).xxiv Where the power of those who benefit – as producers via 
higher incomes, or as consumers via lower prices – exceeds the power of those who bear 
net costs, the social decision rule leads to weaker environmental governance than when 
the reverse is true. In general, the social decision rule yields outcomes that are ‘efficient’ 
in the conventional cost-benefit sense only in the special case where πi is the same for 
everyone. 
 
The social distance between the winners and the losers affects both types of 
internalization. As Princen (1997, 235) observes, the obscuring of environmental costs 
and their displacement onto others ‘impede ecological and social feedback and create 
cognitive, institutional, and ethical lags between initial benefits and eventual full costs.’ 
When those who benefit from polluting activities do not have any social ties to those who 
bear the costs – when they do not know them, or see them, or perhaps even know that 
they exist – there is little scope for internalization through sympathy. When the winners 
are very powerful relative to the losers, the scope for internalization through governance 
is correspondingly limited.  
 
(ii) Power Disparities and the Environment 
 
The power-weighted social decision rule generates two testable hypotheses. The first is 
that the distribution of environmental burdens is correlated with power-related variables 
such as income, education, race, and ethnicity. Communities whose residents are poorer, 
less educated, or belong to historically marginalized racial and ethnic groups will tend to 
bear greater burdens that communities whose residents are affluent, well-educated, or 
belong to historically dominant racial and ethnic groups. 
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As noted above, a substantial empirical literature has emerged on this topic. In general, 
its findings are broadly consistent with this hypothesis. There is room for debate, as 
always, regarding causal explanations for observed correlations. Some researchers have 
suggested, for example, that the inverse relation between average incomes and toxic 
hazards often found by studies in the U.S. may arise not from disproportionate siting of 
hazardous facilities near low-income neighborhoods, but rather from market dynamics in 
which low-income people are drawn to these locations by lower property values.xxv This 
logic is would have to be stretched, however, to explain correlations between hazards and 
race that persist even after controlling for income.xxvi
 
The second hypothesis is that societies with wider power disparities tend to have more 
environmental degradation. That is, power disparities affect the magnitude of pollution 
and resource depletion, as well as their distributional incidence. This hypothesis is based 
on the assumption that there is a positive correlation between net benefits (bi) and power 
(πi), an assumption that seems reasonable in that both are likely to be correlated with 
wealth.xxvii  
 
Empirical studies of this second hypothesis remain scarce, but support for it can be drawn 
from several recent cross-country studies that have investigated the impact of political 
variables on environmental performance. These studies were sparked by research 
suggesting that environmental degradation – or at least some types of it – is concave in 
income, and that high-income countries have passed a turning point beyond which further 
income gains are associated with environmental improvements. In an early example, the 
World Bank (1992, 41) reported an inverted U-shaped relationship of this type between 
atmospheric sulfur-dioxide and per capita income. 
 
This relationship has been dubbed the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ (EKC), due to its 
likeness to the original Kuznets curve depicting a relationship between income inequality 
and per capita income (see Figure 2). As in the case of its namesake, the EKC has 
sometimes been taken to imply that problems that accompany economic growth will be 
resolved, more or less automatically, by growth itself. Thus Beckerman (1992) writes, ‘in 
the end the best – and probably the only – way to attain a decent environment in most 
countries is to become rich.’ 
 
[insert Figure 2 around here] 
 
Notwithstanding the allusion to Kuznets’ earlier work on income inequality, few studies 
of the EKC have examined the relationship between environmental quality and 
inequalities of income, wealth, or power. Yet combining the two inverted-U curves (and 
assuming that the income levels at which they reach their turning points are roughly 
comparable), we can infer a positive correlation between environmental degradation and 
income inequality, as depicted in Figure 2. Such a correlation does not prove causation, 
of course, but it is intriguing. And because the curves themselves (when found to exist at 
all) are statistical relationships, rather than iron laws, there are many outliers – for 
example, countries with relatively low income inequality and low per capita income – 
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making it possible to attempt to distinguish econometrically between the environmental 
impacts of income and inequality. 
 
To investigate the impacts of power disparities on environmental quality, Torras and 
Boyce (1998) analyzed cross-country variations in air pollution (ambient concentrations of 
sulfur dioxide, smoke, and heavy particles), water pollution (concentrations of dissolved 
oxygen and fecal coliform), and the percentages of the population with access to safe water 
and sanitation facilities. In addition to per capita income and the Gini ratio of income 
distribution, their analysis included two other explanatory variables – adult literacy and an 
index of political rights and civil liberties – regarded as relevant to the distribution of power. 
In low-income countries, the estimated coefficients on the rights and literacy variables had 
the expected signs in all cases: higher literacy and greater rights were associated with better 
environmental quality. These coefficients were statistically significant in the majority of 
cases. Controlling for these other variables, the estimated effects of income inequality were 
inconsistent, and the authors suggest that either rights and literacy capture more important 
aspects of power disparities or the quality of the income distribution data is poor (or 
both).xxviii They obtain weaker results for the high-income countries, suggesting that rights 
and literacy are most important when average incomes are low. 
 
Other cross-country studies have also suggested that political rights can be an important 
determinant of environmental outcomes. Scruggs (1998) found greater rights to have a 
statistically significant favorable effect on sulfur dioxide concentrations, favorable but 
weaker effects on particulates and fecal coliform pollution, and an adverse effect on 
dissolved oxygen. Barrett and Graddy (2000) found air pollution by sulfur dioxide, smoke, 
and particulates to be ‘monotonically decreasing in the extent of democratic freedoms;’ for 
water pollutants, they found statistically significant favorable effects in the cases of fecal 
coliform, arsenic, and lead. Harbaugh et al. (2000) also found a strong statistical relationship 
between an index representing democratic participation in government and atmospheric 
concentrations of sulfur dioxide, smoke, and particulates. 
 
Further empirical support for the hypothesis that power disparities have an adverse impact 
on environmental quality comes from a cross-sectional study of the 50 U.S. states by Boyce 
et al. (1999). The authors derived a power-distribution index from state-level data on voter 
participation, tax fairness, access to health care, and educational attainment. In a recursive 
econometric model, they found that states with more equitable distributions of power had 
stronger environmental policies, and that these in turn were associated with better 
environmental quality.   
 
(iii) Globalization and Environmental Cost-Shifting 
 
As globalization extends the arena for environmental cost shifting, the profound 
inequalities in the worldwide distribution of power and wealth become more relevant to 
the political economy of environmental degradation. As Sutcliffe (2003, 2004) observes, 
income inequality at the global level exceeds that at the national level even in the most 
unequal of countries, such as Brazil and South Africa (with the possible exception of 
Namibia). This is hardly surprising, since a global measure of inequality puts the richest 
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strata of the population in the global North in the same universe as the poorest strata of 
the global South. The ‘power equivalents’ of this income distribution – a phrase coined 
by Kuznets (1963, 49) – may likewise be more unequal globally than at the national 
level. If so, the foregoing analysis suggests that globalization may lead both to 
environmental polarization between North and South and to an increase in the total 
magnitude of environmental degradation worldwide. 
 
Having widened environmentally relevant disparities by putting the global rich and the 
global poor into the same basket, globalization eventually may reduce these disparities by 
promoting faster growth in the incomes of the poor than of the rich. But the evidence for 
such a trend is mixed at best.xxix More promising, perhaps, is the possibility of social 
developments – the other side of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ – that increase the 
political effectiveness of demand for environmental protection in low-income countries. 
Here too, however, the record to date is not terribly encouraging. While Weidner and 
Jänicke (2002, 440) find some evidence of a global convergence between North and 
South in environmental policies, at the same time they conclude that capacities for policy 
implementation have become more unequal, resulting in ‘convergence of policies but 
divergence of outcomes.’ 
  
But countervailing forces are set in motion by globalization, too. Advances in 
telecommunications can shrink social distances, increasing the scope for internalization 
through sympathy by giving faces and voices to the people who bear environmental costs, 
and at the same time giving the latter greater access to information and the power that 
comes with it. Alliances across national boundaries, among local communities, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), workers, shareholders, and consumers, can alter 
balances of power. And as discussed in the next section, the phenomenon of global 
environmental change – where there is little or no scope for cost shifting – may not only 
give impetus to global environmental governance but also create new opportunities for 
globally egalitarian politics. 
 
To illustrate these opposing forces, consider the rapid growth of industrial shrimp 
farming in the coastal areas of tropical countries. This has been accompanied by the 
widespread and often violent appropriation of land and aquatic resources from local 
residents, and by adverse environmental impacts on local communities, spurring 
polarization (Stonich and Vandergeest, 2001). At the same time, however, the spread of 
shrimp farms has sparked international alliances of environmental and peasant-based 
NGOs that defend and reassert community rights to natural assets (Stonich and Bailey, 
2000). Similarly, export markets for beef, timber, and minerals have been a major 
stimulus to Amazonian deforestation.  Again, international alliances have emerged to 
support local people who traditionally have relied on the forest for their livelihoods. 
These were instrumental in the creation of extractive reserves in Brazil, where local 
communities have secured their right to harvest latex and other forest products while 
preventing forest clearing (Hall, 1997). As these examples suggest, globalization not only 
poses risks of environmental polarization and increased environmental degradation, but 
also creates opportunities for countervailing forces.  
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V. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
 
The phrase ‘global environmental change’ refers to environmental problems like climate 
change, ozone-layer depletion, and the loss of biodiversity whose impacts are global in 
scope rather than confined to particular localities. This is the counterpart, in the 
environmental sphere, to global integration in the spheres of the market and governance: 
in global environmental change we see integration of the consequences of market and 
governance failures. Insofar as all countries share in its costs and stand to benefit from 
remedial actions, global environmental change would seem to be a force for 
environmental convergence. But in practice, here too there are some polarizing 
tendencies, due to disparate impacts across locations and disparities in the extent of 
governance responses. 
 
Disparate impacts arise not only from the greater vulnerability of poorer populations, but 
also, in some cases, from circumstantial factors. In the case of global warming, for 
example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that average 
surface temperatures on Earth will rise by 1o to 4o C in this century. Even if adverse 
impacts were distributed equally across humankind, the poor would suffer most by virtue 
of the fact that they start from a lower economic base. In addition, climate scientists 
forecast that the hardest-hit places will include parts of Africa, where droughts are 
expected to worsen in frequency and intensity, and low-lying regions of tropical Asia 
prone to increased flooding and cyclones. ‘The effects of climate change,’ the IPCC 
(2001, 8) concludes, ‘are expected to be greatest in developing countries in terms of loss 
of life and relative effects on investment and the economy.’ 
 
These disparate impact are compounded by disparities in the extent of remedial actions. 
Even if international policies to protect the global environment were guided solely by 
considerations of ‘efficiency,’ completely insulated from the impacts of political 
influence, disparities in remedial actions would arise from the application of conventional 
valuation principles that place equal weight on monetary costs and benefits no matter 
whether those to whom they accrue are rich or poor. The willingness of the rich to pay for 
environmental quality, and for goods and services whose production, consumption, and 
disposal cause environmental degradation, generally exceeds that of the poor by virtue of 
their greater ability to pay. Hence in the shadow markets of benefit-cost analysis, as in 
real markets, the ‘benefits’ of emitting carbon dioxide by driving automobiles on 
American and European highways may outweigh the costs of drought in Africa or 
inundations in Bangladesh. This wealth-based principle for efficient resource allocation 
can be contrasted to a rights-based approach founded on the premise that all individuals 
have an equal entitlement to a clean and safe environment (Boyce, 2002, Ch. 2). 
 
In practice, efficiency is not the sole criterion guiding social decisions, including 
decisions to invest in mitigation and adaptation to global environmental change. Political 
influences also play a role, promoting action on some issues and inaction on others. 
Consider the contrast in the international responses to ozone-layer depletion and global 
warming. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances successfully 
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instituted a worldwide phase-out of the use chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Although the 
benefits of CFC use – in refrigeration, air conditioning, fire extinguishers, solvents, 
foams and aerosols – were concentrated in the industrialized countries, so were the 
environmental costs. Ozone-layer thinning is most pronounced at the higher latitudes, and 
light-skinned people are most susceptible to skin cancers and melanomas caused by 
increased ultraviolet radiation. 
 
This may help to explain why efforts of the scientific community to draw attention to the 
risks of ozone-layer depletion met with such success. The United States, along with 
Canada and the Scandinavian countries, took a leading role in international negotiations 
to curb CFC emissions. Despite scientific uncertainties over the precise mechanisms of 
ozone-layer depletion, the U.S. administration under President Ronald Reagan took the 
position that ‘in the real world of imperfect knowledge and uncertainty, we, as 
policymakers, nevertheless have the responsibility to take prudent actions for the benefits 
of generations yet to come.’xxx A contrary suggestion by Reagan’s Secretary of the 
Interior, who urged Americans to adopt a ‘personal protection campaign’ of wearing 
sunscreen, long-sleeved shirts, and dark glasses, met with ridicule (Haas, 1992, 218). 
 
This experience can be contrasted with the faltering progress of international efforts to 
curb global warming by limiting emissions of  carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels. 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol sought to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of industrialized 
countries at roughly 94% of their 1990 levelsxxxi – a modest target compared to the CFC 
phase out – leaving the emissions of developing countries to be negotiated later. In March 
2001 the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush rejected this accord, 
maintaining that the scientific evidence on climate change remains ‘unsettled’ and that 
the treaty is ‘fatally flawed’ because it would impose costs on the U.S. economy while 
not setting emissions ceilings for developing countries. As atmospheric carbon dioxide 
levels continue to rise, the focus of international negotiations is shifting from prevention 
to adaptation.xxxii This shift increases the likelihood of outcomes that differ across 
countries, reflecting differences in their ability to pay for measures to adapt to climate 
change. 
 
A crucial issue in international climate negotiations is the allocation of property rights to 
the carbon-absorptive capacity of the Earth’s atmosphere. This presents both a stumbling 
block and an opportunity. The principle of allocations pegged to historic emission levels, 
which was applied to industrialized countries in the Kyoto agreement, effectively 
‘grandfathers’ these rights on the basis of past appropriation. This formula is naturally 
unacceptable to the developing countries, whose emissions per capita remain an order of 
magnitude below those in the industrialized countries.xxxiii An alternative principle would 
be to allocate rights on the basis of equal per capita entitlements, an idea first proposed 
by Southern environmentalists (Agarwal and Narain, 1991), and more recently endorsed 
by Northern scientists on both normative and practical grounds (Baer et al., 2000).xxxiv 
Failure to resolve this issue is one of the reasons given by the Bush administration for its 
rejection of the Kyoto accord, as noted above. At the same time, a egalitarian resolution  
would make global environmental governance and instrument for reducing North-South 
disparities.  
 20
 
 
VI. WAR AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
In the modern era, war has been a major cause of environmental degradation. This differs 
from ‘normal’ environmental degradation in that it is often an objective, rather than a 
side-effect of the pursuit of other goals. The aim is to make the environment inhospitable 
or fatal to the enemy. Rather than a cost external to the war-maker’s calculus, 
environmental degradation is seen as an internal benefit. 
 
Examples of such deliberate environmental degradation include the application of 
herbicides by the U.S. military to defoliate Vietnam (SIPRI, 1976); the Soviet military’s 
systematic destruction of orchards, irrigation infrastructure, and agricultural ecosystems 
in Afghanistan (Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, 1988); and, most starkly, the 
dropping of nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. 
 
An assessment of globalization’s environmental impacts would be incomplete without 
consideration of impacts related to war. Globalization can affect the extent of war-related 
environmental degradation in two ways: first, by facilitating or restricting access to 
environmentally destructive weaponry such as landmines, nuclear devices, and other 
weapons of mass destruction; and second, by exacerbating or easing tensions within and 
between countries that can precipitate violent conflict. The first affects abilities to 
degrade the environment for military purposes; the second affects willingness to do so. 
 
The proliferation of landmines illustrates the spread of environmentally destructive 
weaponry. Today roughly 60 million landmines are embedded around the world; in the 
most heavily mined countries, like Cambodia, there are more than 100 landmines per 
square mile.xxxv Efforts to curtail their production, use, and transfer – efforts in which the 
non-governmental International Campaign to Ban Landmines played a leading role – 
culminated in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.xxxvi The spread of weapons of mass destruction 
similarly has been constrained, though not entirely prevented, by the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty of 1962 and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Treaty of 1972, agreements that 
can be counted among the world’s most important international environmental accords. 
Here again we see a ‘double movement’ in globalization in the interplay between 
weapons proliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives. 
 
Globalization can exacerbate risks of violent conflict in several ways: (i) by deepening 
inequalities of income, wealth, and power, including ‘horizontal inequalities’ across 
ethnic, regional, and religious lines (Stewart, 2002); (ii) by facilitating the spread of new 
norms and aspirations that undermine the legitimacy of pre-existing inequalities 
(Bardhan, 1997); (iii) by expanding markets for ‘lootable’ resources, such as diamonds 
and oil, that can provide both a motive and the means for conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002); and (iv) by triggering ‘fundamentalist’ reactions against the values (or perceived 
lack of them) of mass consumer culture. At the same time, there are countervailing efforts 
of the United Nations and other international institutions to prevent and resolve conflicts 
and to support ‘postconflict’ peacebuilding.xxxvii  
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The net impact of globalization’s effects on the ability and willingness to degrade the 
environment through war cannot be asserted a priori. It will depend on the actions (or 
inaction) of governments, international institutions, and civil society. Possible outcomes 
include both ‘harmonization upward’ or a ‘race to the bottom’ on the war-to-peace 
spectrum. The dominant trend since the Second World War has been polarization rather 
than convergence: war and the attendant environmental destruction have been 
concentrated in the global South – especially, in recent times, in sub-Saharan Africa – 
largely bypassing the North. Once again, this can be attributed to disparities both in 
circumstances and in the extent of remedial efforts. 
 
 
VII. PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
In the final analysis, the environmental impact of globalization will hinge, above all, on 
how our institutions of governance develop as world markets become increasingly 
integrated. This section considers briefly the prospects for global environmental 
governance by both formal and informal means.xxxviii
 
(i) Formal Governance: Three Avenues 
 
In the development of formal institutions for global environmental governance, three 
broad avenues can be distinguished: 
 
• Creation of a World Environment Organization: One possible avenue would be to 
establish of a new international institution specifically charged with 
environmental protection, empowered to set and enforce environmental policies. 
This has been suggested by various authors (see, for example, Esty 1994, and 
Opschoor 2001), based on the same logic that led to the establishment of 
ministries and agencies for environmental protection at the national level. 
Arguing that ‘environmental externalities should be tackled at their source, which 
is usually at the point of production, and occasionally at the point of consumption, 
but rarely at the point of exchange’ Griffin (2003, 798) observes that international 
efforts to protect whales have proceeded not by prohibiting trade in whale 
products, but through a ban on whale harvests enforced by the International 
Whaling Commission. However desirable in theory, there appears to be little 
prospect that an effective world environmental organization will be established 
anytime soon. Among actually existing institutions, the closest thing to such an 
entity is the Nairobi-based United Nations Environment Programme, whose 
mandate today is strictly limited to provision of information and assistance.  
 
• Issue-specific international environmental agreements: In the absence of a global 
institution empowered to carry out regulatory functions, the international 
community has addressed specific environmental threats – from nuclear 
proliferation to global warming – by means of issue-specific agreements and 
treaties. A list of major international environmental agreements to date is 
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presented in Table 1. While the importance of these agreements is evident, so far 
they have been confined to two subsets of environmental issues: global 
environmental change and military-related environmental damage. ‘Normal’ 
(national-level and local-level) problems of pollution and natural resource 
depletion have been largely ignored, despite the fact that these are often affected 
by global economic integration. 
 
• ‘Greening’ international institutions: A third avenue takes the form of efforts to 
‘green’ international institutions that are dedicated to other objectives, so as to 
bring environmental considerations into their decision-making processes. 
Environmental impact assessments are now a standard (if at times superficial) 
element of project appraisal at the multilateral development banks. While skeptics 
maintain that such efforts ‘will never bring environmental interests on a par with 
economic interests’ (Mol, 2001, 219), it is not evident that the obstacles are any 
less tractable than those to the creation of a world environment organization or 
new international treaties. Indeed, the rationale for credit-allocation institutions 
and policies is precisely to account for externalities and channel financial 
resources to socially desirable uses. There is no intrinsic reason why international 
financial institutions should not allocate credit to advance environmental goals 
(D’Arista and Boyce, 2002). Nor is there any inherent reason why trade 
agreements must rule out consideration of environmental impacts arising from 
production and process methods. In the end, these are political choices. 
 
(ii) Informal Governance: Third-Party Certification as an Example  
 
As discussed above, informal governance can also have important effects on 
environmental performance. One example, at the global level, is the advent of third-party 
certification systems that provide information to consumers and stimulate market-based 
pressures for improved production and process methods. 
 
Perhaps the best-known case is the timber products certification program of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), a non-governmental organization founded in Toronto in 
1993. By mid-2001, 25 million hectares of forests – roughly five percent of working 
forests (i.e., those not set aside in protected areas) worldwide – were certified under FSC 
environmental and social standards (Conroy, 2001, 6). Demand for FSC-certified 
products has been augmented by campaigns by environmental organizations to persuade 
large-volume retail firms to purchase only certified timber when it is available. 
 
This informal governance system emerged in the wake of failed efforts to create an 
officially-sponsored certification system through the International Tropical Timber 
Organization. This created a vacuum into which non-governmental organizations moved 
(Gale, 2002, 279). The result has much in common with formal governance: 
 
Environmental certification programs have most of the same basic organizational 
elements of legal systems. What they generally lack is a command from a 
sovereign… Firms subscribe to them because they determine that it is in their 
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interest to do so. Yet it is increasingly common to describe environmental 
certification as a ‘de facto requirement’ for doing business in many jurisdictions. 
When interviewed, corporate officials often state that they feel they have ‘no real 
choice’ but to become environmentally certified. (Meidinger, 2001, 10166) 
 
Indeed there are a variety of ways in which informal governance through third-party 
certification can be incorporated into formal legal systems; for example, by providing 
incentives via government purchasing or regulatory requirements to firms that meet 
certification criteria.xxxix
 
(iii) Interaction between Formal and Informal Governance: The Example of ‘Right-
to-Know’ Laws 
 
More generally, formal and informal governance do not operate in isolation from each 
other. Formal regulation often emerges in response to pressures from civil society, and 
the scope for informal governance can be increased (or decreased) by formal regulation. 
‘Right-to-know’ laws – formal regulations that compel private firms to furnish 
environmental information to the public – are a good illustration. 
 
Globalization was the midwife at the birth of the most important environmental right-to-
know legislation in the United States: the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), which provides the legal basis for the Toxics Release 
Inventory and other disclosure requirements administered by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (Bouwes et al., 2003). The 1984 chemical disaster in Bhopal, India, at 
a plant owned by the U.S.-based Union Carbide corporation, which led to thousands of 
deaths and injuries, was the key impetus for EPCRA’s passage. There is evidence that 
EPCRA-mandated public disclosure of deliberate and accidental releases of toxic 
chemicals has led to reductions in toxic releases.xl In effect, such right-to-know laws alter 
the balance of power between polluters and pollutees. As Weidner and Jänicke (2002, 
432) put it, ‘The creation of transparency modifies the power structure in favor of 
environmental proponents.’ Translating this into the terminology of neoclassical 
economics, such laws can be said to reduce a market imperfection (imperfect 
information) that impedes Coasian bargaining (Tietenberg and Wheeler, 2000). 
 
EPCRA’s geographical reach is limited to the United States. It does not require U.S.-
based corporations to disclose toxic releases elsewhere – in Bhopal, for example. The 
International Right-to-Know Campaign, launched in 2003 by a coalition of U.S. 
environmental, labor, and human rights groups, is attempting to redress this asymmetry 
by calling for new legislation that would compel U.S.-based corporations to disclose 
information about their environmental and labor practices overseas.xli In a kindred 
initiative, the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign launched in 2002 by an international 
coalition of non-governmental organizations, with backing from the financier George 
Soros, is calling for legislation to require corporate disclosure of payments made to 
governments for access to natural resources (Soros, 2002).xlii Both these efforts illustrate 
how interactions between formal and informal institutions can advance the globalization 
of environmental governance. 
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This essay has viewed globalization as a process of economic integration that embraces 
governance as well as markets. In principle, the globalization of governance can counter 
adverse environmental impacts arising from the globalization of market failure that 
accompanies the integration of world markets. But there is nothing automatic about this 
‘double movement’ – it rests on human agency, and on balances of power between those 
who stand to gain and lose from environmental governance. 
 
In assessing the effects of globalization, my main focus has been its impacts on 
environmental quality in the global North and global South. Closely related to this, 
however, is a concern with impacts on human well-being. Environmentalists tend to 
conflate the two, seeing current and future human well-being as dependent on 
environmental quality. Economists tend to emphasize the tradeoffs that can and do arise 
between environmental quality and the satisfaction of other human needs and wants. 
Such tradeoffs pose the positive question of how they are made in practice, as well as the 
normative question of how they ought to be made. I have suggested above that both 
questions are intimately bound up with the issue of interpersonal tradeoffs in the well-
being of different people. 
 
With respect to the positive question of how societies choose to make tradeoffs, I have 
suggested that these are guided by a power-weighted social decision rule, in which 
benefits and costs are weighed by the power of those to whom they accrue. This leads to 
the hypotheses that power disparities affect the distributional incidence of environmental 
degradation and its overall magnitude.xliii As noted, there is a growing body of empirical 
literature that has reported findings consistent with these hypotheses. 
 
With respect to the normative question of how societies ought to make tradeoffs, I have 
noted the important difference between the wealth-based approach used in conventional 
cost-benefit analysis, in which values are conditioned by ability and willingness to pay, 
and a rights-based approach in which all individuals have equal entitlements to a clean 
and safe environment. As I have discussed at greater length elsewhere, these two 
approaches can have quite different prescriptive implications.xliv Under the wealth-based 
approach, for example, if globalization were to promote environmental polarization, in 
which improvements in the North were coupled with increasing environmental 
degradation in the South, this might be argued to be welfare-maximizing; indeed, in the 
extreme case, pollution imposed on people who have no ability to pay to avoid it is 
regarded as costless. Under a rights-based approach, environmental costs and benefits are 
not weighed by the purchasing power of those to whom they accrue. The normative 
stance that ultimately is adopted by formal and informal institutions for environmental 
governance will have profound implications for how globalization affects both the 
distribution of power and access to environmental quality. 
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This essay has questioned several tenets of conventional thinking about the 
environmental impacts of globalization. I have argued that the assumption that production 
practices in the global North are environmentally superior to those in the global South – 
shared by many champions and critics of globalization alike – can be quite misleading, 
and can lead to the neglect of important environmental issues. I have maintained that 
globalization can promote environmental convergence via ‘harmonization upward,’ as 
argued by its proponents, and via a ‘race to the bottom,’ as argued by its opponents, but 
that neither outcome is assured on a priori grounds. I have also noted that instead of  
convergence, globalization could foster environmental polarization – ‘greening’ the 
North and ‘browning’ the South. Whether this occurs will depend on the extent to which 
those who face environmental burdens are able to take advantage of new opportunities to 
bridge social distances and narrow power disparities, so as to promote internalization 
through sympathy and governance. Similarly, with respect to global environmental 
change and war-related environmental degradation, I have suggested that depending on 
the balance among opposing forces, globalization could promote convergence toward 
better environmental outcomes or toward worse ones, or North-South polarization. 
 
The environmental impacts of globalization not only remain to be seen; they remain to be 
determined. The outcome will not be dictated by an inexorable logic. Rather it will 
depend on how the new opportunities created by the globalization of markets and 
governance alter balances of power, both within countries and among them. As its critics 
fear, globalization could accelerate worldwide environmental degradation and deepen 
environmental inequalities. Yet globalization also gives impetus to countervailing forces 
that could bring about a greener and less divided world. The history of the future is still to 
be written. 
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Figure 1: Environmental Convergence: Four Scenarios 
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Figure 2: Environmental Degradation, Income Inequality, and Per Capita Income 
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Table 1: List of Major International Environmental Agreements 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 Agreement         Date  Issue addressed 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
      International Convention for       1946  Whale depletion 
        the Regulation of Whaling 
 
      Nuclear Test Ban Treaty        1962   Atmospheric nuclear  
          weapons testing 
 
      Biological and Toxic         1972  Chemical and biological 
        Weapons Treaty         weapons 
 
      London Convention        1972  Ocean pollution 
 
      Montreal Protocol         1987  Ozone-layer depletion 
 
      Basel Convention         1989  Transport of hazardous 
          wastes 
 
      Convention on Biological Diversity   1992  Biodiversity loss 
 
      Kyoto Protocol         1997  Carbon emissions and 
          global climate change 
 
      Mine Ban Treaty         1997  Landmines 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
i Senator John Chafee, quoted in Behr, 1993. 
 
ii ‘Sabotage of America’s  Health, Food & Safety, and Environmental Laws,’ advertisement in The 
Washington Post, 14 December 1992, by the Sierra Club, Greenpeace USA, Friends of the Earth, and 
others; quoted in Commission for Environmental Cooperation (1996, 29). 
 
iii For discussion, see section 3 below. 
 
iv There is considerable unevenness within the sphere governance, too. For example, the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, in concert with other official creditors and private banks, have often made 
capital flows to developing countries conditional on implementation of various economic reforms. Within 
the sphere of global governance, environmental policy has lagged behind. 
 
v For an account of the EU’s proposed regulations, see Becker and Lee (2003). 
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vi See, for example, Jänicke (1990). 
   
vii See, for example, Barrett (2000), who also points out that there may be differences between 
harmonization of emission standards and harmonization of environmental quality standards. 
 
viii See Boyce (2000), reprinted in Boyce (2002, ch. 2). 
 
ix Thus Mol (2001, p. 211) writes that economic mechanisms ‘will always fall short in fully articulating 
environmental interests and pushing environmental reforms, if they are not constantly paralleled and 
propelled by environmental institutions and environmental movements.’ 
 
x Both community pressure and firm responsiveness may differ when foreign firms outsource to unbranded 
suppliers. In a study of northern Mexico, [REF NEEDED] found that outsourcing by US firms had adverse 
environmental impacts. 
  
xi For examples, see section 7 below. 
 
xii There is an obvious analogy with labor standards; see Singh (2004). Indeed environmental protectionism 
is sometimes depicted by its critics as a smokescreen for other protectionist interests (see, for example, 
Bhagwati, 1993). 
 
xiii ‘Ecological dumping’ need not be intentional. Rauscher (1994, 825) proposes a more restrictive 
definition: ‘a scenario in which environmental standards are tighter in the non-tradables than in the 
tradables sector.’ While this comes closer to notion of dumping as a deliberate instrument of trade policy, it 
is possible that inter-sectoral disparities in environmental standards are not wholly intentional. In any event, 
proponents of environmental protectionism are more concerned with the effects of ecological dumping than 
its causes. 
 
xiv Low and Yeats (1992) found a rising share of pollution-intensive exports from developing countries 
(particularly in southeast Asia) in the period 1965-1988, albeit from a fairly small base. Extending this 
analysis to the period 1992-2000, Bouvier (2003) finds that this trend has continued, with some eastern 
European countries also emerging as major exporters. 
 
xv If this is accompanied by declining terms of trade for environment-intensive products, the result could be 
both ‘environmental improvement and economic growth in the North and environmental deterioration and 
economic stagnation in the South’ (Muradian and Martinez-Alier, 2001, 286). 
 
xvi See also http://www.slowfood.com/. 
 
xvii Maizels (1992, 189; 1995, 108) reports that substitution by synthetics reduced the developed market-
economy countries’ consumption of natural raw materials by 2.9% per year from 1963-65 to 1971-73, 0.9% per 
year from 1971-73 to 1978-80, and 1.2% per year from 1978-80 to 1984-86. 
 
xviii For details, see Boyce (1995). 
 
xix For further discussion, see Boyce (1996). 
 
xx For accounts of the social impacts in rural Mexico, see Weiner (2002) and Becker (2003). 
 
xxi So far, however, relatively few campesinos appear to have abandoned maize cultivation, in part because of 
the lack of other economic opportunities; see Ackerman et al. (2003). 
 
xxii For further discussion of the value of in situ (in-the-field) crop genetic diversity, see Brush (2000) and 
Thrupp (1998). 
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xxiii For literature surveys, see Bullard (1994), Szasz & Meuser (1997), Bowen (2001), and Pastor (2003). 
 
xxiv ‘Power’ here plays a role analogous to that of ‘influence’ in Becker’s (1983) model of fiscal policy. 
 
xxv See, for example, Been (1994). In a longitudinal study in southern California, one of the few to examine 
empirically the siting versus ‘move-in’ question, Pastor et al. (2001) found strong evidence of 
disproportionate siting. 
 
xxvi See, for example, Bouwes et al. (2003) and Ash and Fetter (2002). 
 
xxvii Where bi and πi  are negatively correlated, the result will be ‘too little’ environmental degradation, by 
the usual efficiency standard, rather than too much. For discussion, see Boyce (2002, 37-38, 51).  
 
xxviii For further discussion of the impacts of income inequality on environmental quality, see Boyce (2003). 
 
xxix For reviews of the evidence, see Sutcliffe (2003, 2004). 
 
xxx Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Benedick, quoted by Haas (1992, 191). 
 
xxxi The exact percentages varied somewhat among the industrialized countries. 
 
xxxii See Revkin (2002). 
 
xxxiii Per capita emissions in the U.S. exceed 5 tons of carbon (tC) per year and those of western Europe and 
Japan are in the 2-5 tC range. The average for developing countries is 0.6 tC/year, with more than 50 
countries having emissions of less than 0.2 tC (Baer et al., 2000). 
 
xxxiv A national-level variant of this principle is the ‘sky trust’ that would use a cap-and-trade approach to 
cut emissions, and rebate the revenues to the public via equal per capita dividends (see Barnes, 2001; 
Barnes and Breslow, 2003). 
 
xxxv UNICEF (1996) reported that Cambodia had 10 million landmines, 143 per square mile. At the time, 
UN put the total number of embedded landmines worldwide at 110 million; more recent estimates are 
generally closer to 60 million. 
  
xxxvi As of October 2003, the treaty had been signed by 141 countries. In addition, nine other countries had 
signed but not completed the ratification process. Prominent among the 44 countries that have not signed or 
ratified the treaty are the United States, Russia, and China. For updated information, see the website of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, http://www.icbl.org/. 
 
xxxvii See, for example, UN Secretary-General (1992), Carnegie Commission (1997) and World Bank 
(1998). 
 
xxxviii For further discussion, see Haas (2002). 
 
xxxix In a review of the potential of environmental certification programs to become ‘engines of change’ in 
U.S. law, Meidinger (2001, 10176) concludes that ‘certification programs are natural targets for 
incorporation by legal systems because they have elements of formality, continuity, and 
institutionalization.’ 
 
xl For discussions of right-to-know legislation in the United States and its impact on environmental 
protection, see Rich et al. (1993), Konar and Cohen (1995), Khanna et al. (1998), and Tietenberg and 
Wheeler (2000). 
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xli For information, see http://www.irtk.org/. 
 
xlii For information, see http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/. 
 
xliii As noted in section 4, the power of those who bear environmental costs relative to those who benefit 
from cost externalization can also be described in terms of their ability to put an implicit or explicit ‘price’ 
on environmental degradation. 
 
xliv See Boyce (2002, chs. 2 and 4). 
